Many large-N cross-national studies claim to show that political institutions and phenomena determine where foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. In this article, I argue that these studies tend to overemphasize statistical significance and often neglect to assess the explanatory or predictive power of their theories. To illustrate the problem, I estimate variations of a statistical model published in an influential article on "Political Risk, Institutions, and FDI." I find that none of the political variables that the authors consider accounts for much of the variation in aggregate FDI inflows. To ensure that this underwhelming result is not driven by misspecification or measurement error, I leverage a large firmlevel data set on the investment location decisions of thousands of multinational firms. Using nonparametric machine-learning techniques and out-of-sample tests, I show that gravity variables can help us develop very accurate expectations about firm behavior but that none of the 31 "political determinants" of FDI that I consider can do much to improve our expectations. These findings have important implications because they suggest that governments retain some room to move in the face of economic globalization.
Empirical support for this line of research is plentiful. Indeed, many large-N cross-national studies claim to show that political institutions and phenomena determine where foreign direct investment flows. As I explain, however, these studies tend to overemphasize statistical significance and often neglect to assess the fit between theory and data. As a result, we still know very little about the explanatory or predictive power of theories of politics and international investment.
The present article is designed as a (partial) remedy to this problem. I begin by arguing that, contrary to common wisdom, there are good substantive reasons to expect that macropolitical country-year variables will only be weakly related to international investment flows. Whether the political environment is a powerful explanator very much remains an open empirical question.
To answer this question, I consider several variations on an influential statistical model of "Political Risk, Institutions, and FDI." In their article, Busse and Hefeker (2007) consider a large sample of developing countries and estimate the association between many political regressors 1 and an aggregate measure of net FDI inflows. As in the original analysis, I find that favorable political conditions tend to be positively correlated with FDI inflows. But although many of the regression coefficients of interest are statistically significant, none of the variables in question can account for much of the variance in the dependent variable: Adding a political regressor to the baseline economic model never increases the adjusted coefficient of determination by more than 0.013. This result is underwhelming, but it could reflect measurement error or misspecification rather than a true lack of explanatory power. To alleviate these concerns, I introduce a large firm-level data set on the investment location decisions of thousands of multinational corporations (Bureau van Dijk 2013) . I then use machine-learning techniques to evaluate the predictive power of 31 "political determinants" of FDI.
This empirical exercise shows that standard gravity variables can help us develop very accurate expectations about firm behavior but that none of the political measures I consider can do much to improve our priors. In fact, models that ignore politics altogether fare just as well as those that leverage all 31 variables in out-of-sample tests. Again, country-level measures of political phenomena and institutions are statistically related to investment location decisions, but that relationship does not hold much power to explain or predict real-world outcomes.
This finding has two important sets of implications for the field. First, the fact that macrolevel political variables are weak predictors of the location and size of international investment flows suggests that states may retain some The variables considered by Busse and Hefeker (2007) are published by the PRS Group.
"room to move" in the face of economic globalization. Indeed, if markets punish governments for adopting the "wrong" modes of governance, the magnitude of this sanction must be proportional to the strength of association among political risk, institutions, and FDI. And if political factors only play a marginal role in explaining investment decisions, then market-based rationales for policy convergence across countries lose some of their appeal.
Second, this article stands as a challenge for future researchers to demonstrate that their theories materially improve prior expectations about investment decisions. Methodologically, political economists would do well to draw on established best practices that include paying more attention to model fit and out-of-sample tests. Thematically, this article shows that the field could benefit from shifting focus away from country-year political indicators and aggregate FDI flow data toward microlevel mechanisms and other aspects of investment behavior. Or, flipping the script, many more valuable contributions could be made to the existing literature on the political effects of international investment.
Politics and Foreign Direct Investment
The relationship between politics and foreign direct investment is the topic of a large and growing body of work. These efforts build on rapid developments in the study of political risk during the 1960-1970s in the fields of business management and economics (see Kobrin 1979 for a contemporary survey). Recent contributions by political scientists (see Jensen, Biglaiser, Li, Malesky, Pinto, Pinto, and Staats 2012) tend to emphasize the role of institutions in overcoming the obsolescing bargain problem identified in Vernon (1971) . 2 
Political Variables Should be Strong Predictors of Investment Behavior
Many political factors are considered important in this literature. For example, some analysts explore the relationship between regime type and FDI flows (Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003; Oneal 1994) . Others have focused on partisanship (Pinto 2013; Pinto and Pinto 2008) , the contractual environment and transaction costs (Henisz 2000; Henisz and Williamson 1999) , or corruption (Caprio, Faccio, and McConnell 2013; Fredriksson, List, and Millimet 2003) .
By and large, the articles cited earlier make unconditional arguments about the effect of politics on investment decisions, but several authors have also emphasized the conditional nature of that relationship. Conditionality can operate at the host-country level: In Mosley (2003) , for instance, the author shows that international investors do not get much actionable information by 2 The expression "obscolescing bargain" refers to the idea that fixed capital assets make multinationals vulnerable to expropriation by host governments who renege on promises made at the time of initial investment.
observing politics in developed countries, but they could take cues from political developments in emerging economies when making investment decisions. Conditional arguments can also be deployed at the firm level as in Wellhausen (2015) , which points out that bondholders and direct investors have different preferences over property rights enforcement. Similarly, Kerner and Lawrence (2014) remind us that firms from different sectors, with different levels of capital intensity, may be more or less sensitive to expropriation; they show that measures of fixed capital expenditures are more closely related to political factors than broad measures of FDI flows or stocks.
Taken together, these works suggest that there are good theoretical reasons to expect that political conditions in host countries will affect multinational corporations' (MNCs) profitability and investment decisions. They also offer impressive empirical support for their claims. Pinto (2013:124) , for example, estimates that the semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to a left-wing government dummy variable could reach unity (in OECD countries, 1974 (in OECD countries, -1996 . In other words, governance from the left could be associated with a near-doubling of net FDI inflows. Jensen (2003:62) also makes a strong case for the importance of political explanators when he concludes that a "move from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime increases FDI inflows by 60 percent."
Political Variables Should Be Weak Predictors of Investment Behavior
Yet in some respects, such large point estimates should strike readers as surprising. Indeed, an emerging strand of research in economics points out that there are, in fact, very few robust determinants of FDI. These studies use a variety of statistical techniques, including sensitivity analysis (Chakrabarti 2001) , extreme bounds analysis (Moosa and Cardak 2006) , and Bayesian model averaging (Blonigen and Piger 2014; Eicher, Helfman, and Lenkoski 2012) , and come to similar conclusions: Traditional gravity variables exert a strong influence on investment behavior, but most other variables (for example, infrastructure, business costs, credit markets) are not robustly associated with FDI flows.
3 Li (2015:4) comes to similar conclusions after reviewing empirical work on the relationship between tax incentives and FDI flows, concluding that an "extensive body of literature shows that the effects of tax incentives are dubious at best."
These results have clear implications for our reading of political science works on the topic: If economic factors that are tightly linked to MNCs' bottom line are fragile predictors of FDI flows, then we must be cautious 3 The conclusion in Blonigen and Piger (2014:777) is representative: "The covariates with consistently high inclusion probabilities include traditional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labour endowments and trade agreements. Variables with little support for inclusion are multilateral trade openness, most host-country business costs, host-country infrastructure (including credit markets) and host-country institutions."
when assessing the influence of (political) explanators that are further removed in the causal chain. There are other reasons to be careful when interpreting the output of country-year FDI regressions. For instance, the obscolescing bargain theoretical frame can lead us to under-appreciate the fact that firms can use several strategies to mitigate risk: They can purchase investment insurance, invest in joint ventures with local firms, build surplus capacity, or appeal to the investor-state dispute settlement provisions of international investment treaties. To be sure, implementing those strategies can be costly, and the need to purchase insurance (in one form or another) could discourage some investors. Still, the availability of risk mitigation strategies for firms should weaken the relationship between investment decisions and countrylevel indicators of political risk.
Another underappreciated feature of the political economy of FDI is that "poor governance" can have ambiguous effects on firms' incentives. Corruption, for example, imposes costs and uncertainty, since it acts as a de facto tax and because bribery agreements are not enforceable by law. However, corruption may also be attractive for foreign investors if it helps firms strike advantageous deals with local officials (for example, to gain access to resources, suppress labor, or relax environmental regulation). Indeed, there is a long tradition of work in political science and economics that shows that the "grabbing hand" of corruption is sometimes counterbalanced by a "helping hand" (see Tanzi 1998 for a review). Lui (1985) , for example, points out that bribery can often be used to speed up bureaucratic processes in the host country; Huntington (1968:61) writes that corruption may allow multinationals to gain access to the political system in countries where they have a weak domestic base of support; and Li and Resnick (2003) argue that, in corrupt environments, MNCs may seek to bribe and collude with the host government to influence domestic politics in the host country. There is also empirical support for this alternative view: Egger and Winner (2005) , for instance, use panel data and show that, after controlling for confounders, corruption is positively correlated with FDI inflows.
In sum, while there has been much theoretical and empirical work on the political determinants of FDI, there are also good reasons to expect that country-level features of the political environment will only be weakly related to international investment flows. Whether, on balance, political factors are important explanators/predictors of investment flows remains an open empirical question.
Model Fit and Predictive Power
Political methodologists have long recognized the important role that fit statistics must play as complements to parameter and uncertainty estimates. Case in point: During The Great R 2 /SEE Debate of 1990, everyone agreed that prediction-based goodness-of-fit measures must inform the interpretation of quantitative data analyses, but simply disagreed over which statistic to deploy in practice (Achen 1990; King 1990; Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1990 ).
Yet, despite the obvious importance of model fit, researchers in many fields of political science still know little about the explanatory or predictive power of their theories. In "The Perils of Policy by P-Value," for instance, Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) show how the traditional focus on statistical significance in conflict studies has led scholars to emphasize relationships that have little bearing on real-world outcomes.
Likewise, very little attention has been paid to the explanatory or predictive power of theories that link politics to FDI. In light of the previous discussion, it seems important to assess whether macropolitical variables can help us develop better expectations about international investment flows. In the next section, I take a step in that direction by estimating variations on a statistical model developed in an important study of "Political Risk, Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment" (Busse and Hefeker 2007) .
Explained Variance in a Published Study
In their article, Busse and Hefeker (2007:397) aim to identify the political "indicators that matter most for the activities of multinational corporations." Using regression analysis on panel data, the authors find "that government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption and ethnic tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy are highly significant determinants of foreign investment inflows."
The work of Busse and Hefeker (2007) is a good starting point because (1) their article has already had tremendous influence on the field, and it continues to be cited regularly 4 ; (2) their sample covers the set of developing countries where political risk should matter most for investment decisions; and (3) their empirical strategy is representative of many similar efforts, with a baseline model that should be familiar to readers:
On March 7, 2016, Google Scholar recorded 693 citations for Busse and Hefeker (2007) .
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The estimates that this model produces could be subject to endogeneity bias if FDI has a feedback effect on political conditions in the host country. For instance, pressure from foreign investors could push local government to improve property rights protection, or investment could spur economic growth and an attendant improvement in political stability. For the purposes of this study, these factors do not pose a major threat to inference: They suggest that β 5 may be biased away from zero (that is, the direction of the omitted relationship). In other words, it seems unlikely that the weak explanatory power of political variables is an artifact of endogeneity.
In a first series of tests, I consider data on net FDI inflows from UNCTAD's World Investment Reports.
6 Data on GDP (constant 2005 US$), GDP growth, ratio of trade to GDP, and inflation are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
7,8 I consider 10 political regressors, all published by the Political Risk Services Group. Ω represents a vector of country fixed effects. I also include the year and its square to account for time trends. To guard against the possibility that year-to-year swings in FDI skew the results, all variables are averaged over 4-year intervals. The sample covers 89 countries that the World Bank identifies as low or middle income.
To see if political variables materially improve our capacity to explain changes in investment behavior, I estimate a baseline model without any political variable. Then, I estimate a series of models with different political predictors and compare measures of fit. Tables 1 and 2 present the results from this exercise (column names identify the Political variable used in each model, and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity).
The results are broadly consistent with the original published analysis: Favorable political conditions (that is, high values on the Political variables) tend to be associated with higher levels of FDI inflows, and several of the Political coefficients are statistically significant. Coefficient estimates and standard errors, however, only tell part of the story. Here, the main quantity of interest is the increase in explained variance that can be obtained by adding a political variable to the baseline apolitical model. In that respect, the results in Tables 1 and 2 are striking: None of the 10 PRS variables yields more than a 0.013 increase in the value of adjusted R 2 . One concern is that the models shown previously may be underspecified, since they omit several host-country determinants of investment location (for example, labor force characteristics and technological capacity). To account for such factors, the models in Table 8 of the online appendix add four proxy variables: GDP per capita, literacy rate, share of urban population, and number of telephones per 1,000 people (World Bank 2014).
9,10 Another potential problem stems from the nature of the dependent variable. As Kerner and Tables 2 and 3 of Busse and Hefeker (2007) already make clear that political variables do not make much contribution to fit in models of FDI per capita. Since an exact replication would be superfluous, all the models I estimate here focus on net FDI inflows.
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The following transformation was applied to the FDI, growth, and inflation variables to account for the presence of negative values:
These additional controls are not available for the full panel. Accordingly, I apply the multiple imputation routine implemented by Honaker and King (2010) . 10 In terms of omitted variable bias, it is important to keep in mind that the type of structural/economic conditions that favor inward FDI flows tend to be positively correlated with "good governance." It thus seems reasonable to expect that omitting to control for these conditions will induce a positive bias in the political coefficient estimates. In other words, the expected direction of bias works against the main finding of this article, which is that political variables are weak predictors of investment decisions.
Lawrence (2014) point out, considering flows may not always be appropriate to test theories of politics and FDI. Tables 9 through 16 of the online appendix thus show results using four alternative dependent variables. The first is a measure of inward FDI stock from UNCTAD. The other three measures are from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis: the value of Plant, Property, and Equipment; total assets; and capital expenditures. 11 Finally, I present other tests with regional dummy variables (Tables 17 and 18 of the online appendix), and country-year data instead of 4-year averages (supplemental Tables 19 and 20) . None of these alternatives reveals a large difference in model fit between apolitical and political models.
What Could Explain the Weak Explanatory Power of the Country-Level Models?
These underwhelming results seem to cast doubt on the idea that PRS variables could hold strong, independent explanatory power over flows of international investment. But before drawing conclusions from this reexamination, it is worth considering four reasons why the political variables considered in Busse and Hefeker (2007) could appear to be such weak explanators.
Measurement error
The main data that allow cross-national and over-time comparisons in FDI flows at the aggregate level are published in UNCTAD's World Investment Reports and in the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments Yearbooks. The breadth of coverage and convenience of these data have made them a primary source for research on international investment in both political science and economics.
It is well known, however, that drawing inference from these data sets is fraught with issues. Kerner and Lawrence (2014) and Kerner (2014) provide excellent overviews of the methodological problems involved in measuring aggregate FDI, with a focus on the use of these measures in studies of the political determinants of FDI. Three problems, in particular, seem to be worth considering. First, bilateral FDI data typically record information on the location of an investment and the location of its direct owner, rather than its global ultimate owner. Second, crossnational comparisons are seriously hampered by discrepancies in data-collection methods and by inconsistent reporting standards. This is particularly problematic in the accounting of reinvested earnings, a category that makes up a very large share of total FDI. Third, MNCs often control capital assets that were financed through debt issued in the host country's financial market, and these funds are typically unaccounted for in the aggregate FDI data.
These problems pose a nontrivial threat to inference because political explanators are likely to be correlated with the error in our measures of FDI. For example, if property rights protection in the host country dictates a firm's decision to invest there in the first place, it should also influence its choice to reinvest or repatriate foreign-earned income. And while typical treatments of the linear model tend to conclude that measurement error in the dependent variable is rather unproblematic (for example, Greene 2008:326), this conclusion does not hold where, as is the case here, the error is correlated with regressors (Wooldridge 2010:76-82) , or when the quantity of interest is the coefficient of determination (Majeske, Lynch-Caris, and Brelin-Fornari 2010) . Therefore, it seems plausible that the weak results found earlier are due to measurement error.
Wrong Explanators
The authors I cited in my brief review of the literature must be commended for developing precise concepts that can be translated into measurable quantities and testable propositions. As a general matter, however, it is fair to say that the political determinants of FDI could work through a variety of distinct channels. For example, "institutional constraints on the Executive" could reduce the cost of doing business by making expropriation less likely (property rights protection), by preserving the status quo (veto players), by empowering a professional and independent judiciary (rule of law), or by limiting the discretionary power and rent extraction capabilities of the bureaucracy and the Executive (corruption). Each of these causal pathways, in turn, could be operationalized using a slew of alternative measures. Sifting through the hundreds of "quality of governance" indicators assembled by Teorell, Charron, Dahlberg, Homberg, Rothstein, Sundin, and Svensson (2013) should suffice to convince anyone that there exists a plethora of likely political determinants of investment behavior.
In that context, readers could easily challenge the results of Busse and Hefeker (2007) on theoretical or measurement grounds, by arguing that the authors did not consider the "right" measure of political risk or institutions. It is thus possible that the lack of improvement in explained variance that we observed earlier would be due to mismeasurement of the explanatory variables.
But if several stories can link politics to FDI, and if we can test any of those arguments using a large set of alternative regressors, we run the risk of finding some statistically significant coefficient estimates, even if only by chance. In other words, the availability of many country-year political variables makes "fishing" easier than it perhaps should be, a problem that is compounded by the tendency of academic journals to publish novel results and articles that reject null hypotheses (Gerber and Malhotra 2008; Sterling 1959) .
This implies that some published results about politics and FDI may be spurious and suggests the need for a unified statistical framework that allows us to test the explanatory or predictive power of a large number of political predictors simultaneously.
Conditional Association
As I explained, Busse and Hefeker (2007) are far from alone in making "unconditional" claims about the relationship between political phenomena and international investment flows. However, several authors have since refined the theoretical analysis by arguing that the relationship in question should be moderated by firm or host-country characteristics. If the relationship between politics and FDI is indeed conditional, then finding weak results in a pooled sample should not come as a surprise.
Within vs. Between Variance
One notable feature of the research design by Busse and Hefeker (2007) is that the authors use a fixed effects regression model to estimate their quantities of interest. This choice is easy to understand and motivate on methodological grounds, and it is not surprising to see that the approach has become standard in this field of research.
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It is important to recognize, however, that the within model can be limiting because it forces us to ignore much of the relevant variation in the phenomena of interest. Indeed, political risk variables and institutions tend to be very sticky over time, and most of the variation in politics is observed between countries rather than within them. For example, consider the PRS Bureaucracy Quality variable: In the sample of 89 developing countries considered earlier, the mean of within-country standard deviations is 0.37, whereas the standard deviation of within-country means is 1.06.
A replication of models from Busse and Hefeker (2007) can show that political variables do not explain much of the within-country variance in net FDI inflows, but this exercise does not carry much information about politics and FDI along the cross-sectional dimension. Since that is where most of the relevant variation occurs, it seems possible that the tests presented earlier understate the true strength of association.
A Firm-Level Data Analysis
In the previous section, I replicated the results from a well-known study of political risk, institutions and FDI and showed that macro level political variables have little effect on the share of variance in FDI that can be accounted for by our statistical models. I also pointed to four methodological problems that could explain this weak result. In the rest of this article, I leverage a big firm-level data set with nonparametric machine learning techniques to address these concerns and reassess the relationship between politics and FDI.
To address the question of measurement error, I jettison the flawed aggregate FDI data that are used in much of the literature and consider a large firm-level data set on the investment location decisions of multinationals. These data are cross-sectional. As I suggested earlier, this feature should not hamper the investigation of the effect of political variables because political/institutional variables are sticky over time and because most of the variation in political explanators is cross-sectional; that variation across countries should be particularly salient for business managers who must choose where they will invest.
To leverage these data, I use Random Forests, an algorithm that is often deployed in the field of machine learning to assess the predictive power of multiple predictors at once. This approach is particularly well suited to the context at hand because forests can take into account complex interactive data structures like those implied by our conditional theories of politics and FDI.
In sum, applying the random forest algorithm to firm-level data allows us to assess the strength of association between politics and FDI, while addressing the four concerns raised earlier.
Dependent Variable
The Orbis database is maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. It includes information on over 120 million private companies in nearly every country. Most of these firms run purely domestic operations, but many are multinationals. In my analyses, I consider the subset of companies that Orbis links to a Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) (that is, subsidiaries) and exclude those that reside in the same country as their GUO (that is, domestic investments). This leaves a sample of about 193,000 foreign subsidiaries and 157,000 parent companies. Orbis offers the distinct advantage of tracking multinationals from many countries, unlike more regionally focused databases like the US Bureau of Economic Analysis' Survey of Direct Investment Abroad. For all the analyses in this article, I use a binary dependent variable that indicates whether a particular multinational owns a subsidiary in a given country.
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Orbis does not appear to have been exploited much in political science, but it is often used in other disciplines, where it tends to be treated as representative of the worldwide population of large GUOs.
14 It is important to recognize, however, that Bureau van Dijk (2013) does not claim to produce a random sample of firms but rather emphasizes the comprehensiveness and accuracy of its publications. Unfortunately, due to the many problems that afflict other measures of FDI, we do not have a good external benchmark to definitively establish the representativeness of the Orbis data. 13 The paucity of reliable firm-level data on other features such as revenues or number of employees prevents me from using alternative dependent variables in the context of this article. 14 Recent examples include Arulampalam, Devereux, and Maffini (2012) Nevertheless, descriptive statistics can provide a measure of reassurance: Table 3 shows that the share of firms recorded by Orbis in countries of each income category is closely related to FDI flows. The rank of individual countries in the worldwide distribution of both variables is also very similar (see Figure 5 of the online appendix). Given that the two variables measure different but strongly related concept (that is, aggregate levels of FDI vs. location decisions), this high degree of similarity is encouraging.
Sampling
The unit of analysis for all the following tests is the GUO-country. Because there are many possible hosts, and given that firms typically invest only in a handful of places, my dependent variable is highly unbalanced: Just under 2% of observations show positive values. This "unbalanced labels" situation is common in machine-learning applications, and it poses two minor challenges: Considering all observations imposes an unnecessary computational burden, and it is easy to devise a highly accurate but trivial prediction model.
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One common solution, which I adopt here, is to produce a balanced sample by selecting on the dependent variable: Choose all observations with a value of one, and draw a random sample of nonevents of the same size. This choice-based approach can be used with any of the following classification algorithms. The strategy is analogous to the sampling scheme used by Prentice and Pyke (1979) and advocated by King and Zeng (2001) in the rare events logit case. It produces data sets that are less computationally costly to use and allows us to calculate measures of predictive accuracy that value our ability to classify ones and zeros equally.
A First Look
Before considering the full set of predictors, it is useful to look at a subset of variables in the familiar context of logistic regression. My goal is not to compute credible point estimates. Rather, this descriptive exercise aims to provide a sanity check for the firm-level data and to illustrate the fact that in large data sets, political predictors can appear strongly related to the conditional probability of investment even if this relationship is of minor relevance to real-world outcomes. I begin by randomly splitting the data set in two equal parts. The first is used to estimate logit models and the second to test their predictive accuracy in new data. The models I consider in Table 4 include-at most-three regressors: log GDP of the host country (World Bank 2014), geographic distance between the host and the firm's home country (Mayer and Zignago 2006) , and the level of democracy of the host (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2012) .
Three points are especially noteworthy. First, all the coefficients are statistically different from zero. Given the sample size, this is not surprising. Second, the Orbis data generally behave as expected: Distance between home and host countries is negatively associated with the likelihood of investment, but democracy and GDP both show positive coefficients.
The third conclusion we can draw from Table 4 is most crucial for the arguments in this paper: Including a measure of regime type to the baseline model yields very little improvement in the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of the logit model. Indeed, the difference in predictive accuracy for the two models is less than 0.5 percentage point, which suggests that the Polity variable does not appear to have much predictive power, above and beyond the information that is already conveyed by gravity variables.
To generalize these insights, I conduct several other tests using the same basic logit framework. To begin, I substitute the polity index for each of the 10 political regressors produced by the PRS group. Then, I consider a set of "thicker" models that control for distance, log GDP, log GDP per capita, share of urban population, and for the number of telephone lines per 1,000 people. As Table 24 of the online appendix shows, the main conclusions are unaltered. In the rest of the article, I push further by using an algorithm that allows us to consider the predictive power of a much broader set of covariates. 
A Nonparametric Prediction Model
Over the past years, many supervised learning algorithms have been developed to predict binary outcome variables using many predictors. Here, I consider one set of techniques in more detail: classification trees and random forests. As I will argue, this approach is particularly well suited to the problem at hand because it can be used to model unconditional as well as conditional relationships between politics and FDI.
Trees
Classification trees are a nonlinear and nonparametric prediction technique developed by Breiman, Friedman, Stone, and Olshen (1984) . Their accuracy, scalability, and ability to capture complex interactive data structures help explain why classification trees have had such an impact on statistical practice; the work of Breiman et al. (1984) has garnered over 28,000 citations, 16 and trees have been deployed in a wide variety of settings, from astronomy and genomics to sociology. In short, classification trees are not a novelty item. They are one of the most basic and useful tools available to researchers who work with high-dimensional data.
To understand how this technique works, it is useful to proceed in two steps. To begin, I illustrate how an existing tree can be used to make predictions on a binary variable. Then, I consider some of the computational aspects involved in growing a tree. Figure 1 shows a decision rule designed to predict if a large multinational x will invest in country y. Starting from the top, we begin by checking if the host is a small economy (that is, GDP smaller than some cutpoint c 1 ). If the host is large, we predict that the firm will have a subsidiary there; if the host is small, Figure 1 . A hypothetical subtree for prediction of a binary outcome. 16 Google Scholar, October 16, 2015-10-16. more conditions need to be considered. The top node of the tree refers to a property of the host country (GDP), but the second level node splits the data based on firm characteristics instead (industry). If the multinational works in mining, a capital-intensive activity that renders it sensitive to expropriation, property rights enforcement could be an important factor in location decisions. If the firm comes from the financial sector instead, then price stability and central bank independence may be better predictors of investment behavior.
This decision rule illustrates one of the main benefits of the approach: Classification trees can capture the types of complex interactive data structures that are often of interest to political scientists (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Franzese and Kam 2009) . In Figure 1 , the investment decision was unconditionally related to the size of the host economy (that is, larger markets attract international investors). The top node of that tree could also be interpreted as embodying the (conditional) broad vs. narrow distinction from Mosley (2003:37) , where the author argues that international investors get more useful information by monitoring politics in the developing world rather than in developed economies.
17 Figure 1 also accounts for the possibility that capital-intensive industries like mining may be more sensitive to property rights protection, an argument that is consonant with the work of Kerner and Lawrence (2014) and several others.
Classification trees like this one are easy to construct. To understand how, it is useful to think of trees not in static terms but rather as a process of recursive partitioning of the predictor space. More concretely, we need to answer three main questions: (1) which variables will be used to split the data, (2) in what order, (3) based on which cut-points? Figure 2 illustrates the process of growing a tree in a simple case with two predictors (GDP and property rights) and 20 observations on a binary outcome. In the left panel, each number represents the decision to invest in a host country with a particular combination of GDP and property rights ("1" means investment, and "0" no investment).
To begin, notice that if we naively predict 1 for all observations, we achieve 50% predictive accuracy (0s and 1s are represented in equal proportions in this data set). We can improve on this by making different predictions for different subsets of the data. For example, if we expect more investment in rich countries, we could predict 1 for every observation that falls to the right of cut-point c 1 and 0 for all others. This would allow us to classify 15 of the 20 observations accurately. We can further improve the model by recursive partitioning: After the c 1 split, we make a second cut at c 2 and predict 1 everywhere but in the lower-left section. This raises prediction accuracy to 85%. The resulting decision rule is represented in tree form in the right panel of Figure 2 . 18 Notice that, as in the previous example, conditional/interactive arguments will be accommodated by the model, as long as they improve fit.
In the simple case of Figure 2 , it was easy to see that c1 and c2 were optimal cut-points. In practice, however, we often want to grow trees that include many more predictors. To deal with high-dimensional data, software implementations 19 of the model use greedy algorithms 20 that select appropriate partitions by minimizing a prediction-based loss function (for example, gini impurity index, Hastie, Tibshirani, Friedman, and Franklin [2013:309] ). Greedy procedures are computationally efficient, and they tend to perform well in most applications.
Unfortunately, greedy procedures also impart an undesirable property to the prediction model: When considering a set of correlated predictors, the algorithm will sometimes pick one variable and ignore its cousins. Since many of the political determinants of FDI listed in Table A1 are correlated, this means that we risk growing a tree that relies on a subset of predictors that was chosen somewhat arbitrarily. Classification trees are also burdened by a second important drawback: They tend to have low bias but high variance (Hastie et al. 2013) . This, in turn, may reduce their ability to make accurate out-of-sample predictions.
Forests
Thankfully, both of these concerns can be assuaged by using an ensemble method like bagging: "The essential idea in bagging is to average many noisy but approximately unbiased models, and hence reduce the variance. Trees are ideal candidates for bagging, since they can capture complex interaction structures in the data, and if grown sufficiently deep, have relatively low bias" (Hastie et al. 2013:587) . In that spirit, Breiman (2001) developed a modification of bagging that he named "Random Forests". Forests are grown as follows:
(1) create many bootstrap samples by drawing observations with replacement from the original data set; (2) for each bootstrap sample, randomly select a subset of predictor variables and use this subset of predictors to grow a classification tree; (3) calculate the ensemble predictions by taking a majority vote among all the trees (that is, for each observation, the ensemble prediction corresponds to the most common predicted value across the bootstrapped trees).
The most important characteristic of this procedure is that bootstrapped trees are grown using different predictors and that, as a result, they will yield a diverse set of predictions for the outcome variable. This matters because, as Dietterich (2000:1) points out, a "necessary and sufficient condition for an ensemble of classifiers to be more accurate than any of its individual members is if the classifiers are accurate and diverse (Hansen and Salamon 1990) ."
21 For this reason, random forests typically outperform single trees in terms of variance and out-of-sample predictive accuracy (Breiman 2001; Hastie et al. 2013 ).
An additional benefit of this random subsetting approach is that it gives each predictor a chance to be considered in the absence of its close correlates. This reduces the likelihood that a variable will be completely ignored when other correlated predictors are greedily selected by the optimization algorithm. Thus, forests tend to handle multicollinearity much better than single trees.
The Political Determinants of Investment Location Decisions
The main purpose of this article is to determine if we can use political information to build more accurate models of investment behavior. In this section, I use split-sample tests to compare the predictive accuracy of two random forests. The first is a minimalist apolitical model that only relies on the following predictors: GDP of the host country, (World Bank 2014) and the geographic distance between home and host countries (Mayer and Zignago 2006) . The second forest is a political model that adds 31 political variables to the baseline (Table A1 lists all variables and sources).
My selection criteria for country-level political variables are exceedingly liberal: They need to measure a macrofeature of politics in the host country, to be plausibly related to the behavior of international investors, and to be available for a broad cross-section of countries. My goal is to include many variables in order to stack the odds in favor of a "politics matters" conclusion. The list of political predictors that I consider includes many of the measures that were used in prior research on the political determinants of FDI (for example, regime type, property rights protection, leftwing government), as well as several other variables that do not seem to have been considered so far (for example, religion in politics).
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Readers will note that the list of variables in Table A1 is limited in (at least) one important respect: It includes political factors that could be characterized as "institutional" or "environmental" but excludes more specific public policies such as corporate tax rates. This choice imposes strong constraints on the inference that can be drawn from my research design, but this is a compromise we must accept. To see why, compare how political scientists have operationalized the link between democratic institutions and FDI (for example, Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003) to the rich empirical literature on corporate taxation produced since the pioneering Hartman (1984) paper. While the democracy-FDI relationship can often be modelled using a linear additive structure or with simple multiplicative interactions, estimating the effect of tax policy on international investment requires a very different methodological apparatus. Indeed, public finance economists tend to employ complex response functions that account for a wide array of factors, including the wedge between statutory tax rates at home and abroad, whether the income of a multinational is subject to territorial or worldwide taxation, the tax rate that applies to repatriated earnings, the difference between expected after-tax returns in home and host countries, and the cost of relocation or income shifting (De Mooij and Ederveen 2008; Hartman 1985; Hines and Rice 1994; Slemrod 1990) . As I explained, the prediction algorithms that I use can account for the linear and interactive data structures that are used in the "political determinants of FDI" literature, but it cannot act as substitute for the types of identification strategies that need to be deployed for policy evaluation. Restricting the set of variables that I consider clarifies the scope conditions of my claims and links those claims more tightly to the political science literature to which this article speaks.
In addition to the variables described earlier, my prediction models also leverage firm-level predictors. First, I include a measure of internationalization, that is, of the number of countries in which a company has operations. This is a useful predictor, which acts as a proxy for a firm's size and for the intensity of its international activities. Second, I introduce a series of binary variables that record whether firms have activities in each of the 24 top-level codes of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). These are important because firms in certain sectors (for example, shipping) may establish many more subsidiaries, simply due to the nature of their activities.
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The NAICS dummies are also critical because they allow the random forests to accommodate the possibility that some firms are more sensitive to political conditions than others. For example, since there is a strong relation between industrial category and capital intensity (Table 5) , a classification tree with NAICS dummies can account for (conditional) theoretical arguments that link capital-intensity, likelihood of expropriation, and investment location decisions. The dummies also allow us to represent other types of conditional arguments, such as those that inspired the tree in Figure 1 .
Random Forest Results
As in the logistic regression exercise shown earlier, I split the data set in two equal parts randomly. I use the "training set" to fit a random forest model and the "test set" to measure its predictive accuracy in new data. 24 Table 5 . Average Capital Shares by Industry (1987 Industry ( -2005 Source: Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) . 23 The Orbis data set that I use is very limited in terms of firm-level information. For instance, while it includes variables for the number of employees and revenues of subsidiaries, these data display enough (nonrandom) missingness to be useless for inference purposes. 24 In applications where predictive power is paramount, a better approach would be to divide the data set in three, using one part as a "validation set" to optimize the tuning parameters of the predictive model (for example, through grid search and cross-validation). For simplicity, I grow a forest of 50 trees using a reasonable set of default tuning parameters: the criterion used to measure the quality of splits is Gini impurity, the maximum number of predictors is fixed to the square root of the number of available predictors, and the depth of trees is not otherwise constrained. In Table 23 of the online appendix, I show that using different tuning parameters does not improve predictive accuracy substantially, and that it does not produce a larger gap between the predictive accuracies of apolitical and political models.
The first row of Table 6 reports the out-of-sample predictive accuracy for the baseline political and apolitical models. Two main conclusions emerge. First, the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of the random forest model is high, reaching about 90% in a test set with equal proportions of 0s and 1s. Second, considering politics does not improve our expectations with respect to investment behavior. Even if we add a large array of political predictors to the baseline, the predictive accuracy of the political and apolitical models remains substantively indistinguishable.
So far, my main empirical strategy has been to compare the predictive accuracy of competing models, which I considered as monolithic blocks of predictors. An alternative way to assess the predictive power of individual variables is to compute their importance, or mean decrease impurity. For each node t in the tree T, we make a split s t in the data set using variable ν(st). Let p(t) be the proportion of observations to reach node t in the decision tree, and Δ i (s t , t) be the decrease in gini impurity that results from splitting at t. The importance of variable X m is defined as the weighted impurity decrease at all nodes where ν is used, averaged over all N T trees in the forest (Louppe, Wehenkel, Sutera, and Guerts et al. 2013:2) :
Intuitively, the importance of X m measures the reduction in misclassification that results from using X m to partition the sample space, weighed by the number of observations that were classified using that variable. Variables that allow accurate classification and/or that are located near the top of the tree will thus show a high level of importance. Figure 3 shows that, unsurprisingly, three variables hold much more importance than any other in producing accurate classification: GDP, Distance, and Internationalization.
Robustness
I take several steps to ensure that these findings are robust. First, because not all the political variables have broad country coverage, the baseline political model was estimated using a subset of 16 variables. Row 2 of Table 6 shows results using the full set of 31 political predictors, but in a smaller sample of countries. Second, to account for the possibility that political indicators carry less information in developed nations (Mosley 2003) , I calculate predictive accuracy separately for high-and low-income countries (Table 6 , rows 3-4).
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Third, because the models described in Table 6 could be considered underspecified, I estimate "thicker" prediction models that also include the share of urban population, number of telephones per 1,000 people, GDP per capita, and population size (World Bank 2014), as well as measures of economic, administrative, and demographic distance between home and host countries (Berry, Guillén, and Zhou 2010) .
Fourth, to be certain that my results are not driven by firms in low tax jurisdictions, I exclude all countries that belong to the list of tax havens assembled by Gravelle (2013) .
Fifth, as a further check on the representativeness of the Orbis data, I reestimate the models using a stratified sample of GUOs, drawn in proportion to the GDP of their home countries.
Sixth, to confirm that my results are not driven by the choice of prediction algorithm, I consider four alternative procedures: logistic regression, Extremely Randomized Trees (Geurts, Ernst, and Wehenkel 2006) , Bagging (Pedregosa et al. 2011) , and AdaBoost (Freund and Schapire 1996) . Seventh, to guard against the possibility that the predictive power of (geographically clustered) political variables is captured by the distance variable, I reestimate all models without considering geography.
Finally, I reestimate models while excluding outlier countries. To identify those outliers, I regress the share of subsidiaries (parents) against the share of FDI inflow (outflow) that goes to each country, and I inspect the studentized residuals from those regressions. I consider each country with a Bonferroni p-value smaller than .05 as an outlier, and I exclude them from the prediction model.
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The results for robustness checks 3-8 are reported in the online appendix. None of these alternative approaches alters the main conclusion: Political variables remain very weak predictors of investment location decisions.
Conclusion
In theory, many political phenomena could affect multinationals' propensity to invest in a country. The goal of this article was to offer a systematic empirical assessment of the explanatory and predictive power of several frequently cited "political determinants of FDI." Using a replication exercise and an original data analysis for a large sample of multinationals, I showed that the information carried by country-level political indicators does not allow us to develop substantially better expectations about firm behavior.
This finding could have important consequences for how we understand policymaking in an integrated world. If macropolitical and institutional features only play a marginal role in the location decisions of MNCs, then nations may enjoy latitude in the design of their governing institutions, in spite of growing pressure by international capital markets.
This article's findings should also inform a reevaluation of the state of knowledge in our field. To be clear, the results described herein must not lead to a wholesale rejection of the idea that politics matters for FDI. Rather, prior works on the topic must be assessed as a function of readers' substantive interest and purpose. If we are mainly interested in the mechanisms that link political variables to investment behavior, either because of their intrinsic importance or because their logic carries over to other contexts, then it makes little sense to adopt predictive accuracy or share of explained variance as a criteria of substantive importance. In contrast, if we motivate our inquiry by pointing to politics as a "driver" of FDI, then it is incumbent on the researcher to demonstrate that the proposed theory fits new data well enough to have practical significance. In such cases, I argued that computing out-of-sample measures of predictive accuracy imposes itself as a best practice for model assessment.
Finally, the present article leaves open several promising avenues for future research. For instance, it is important to recognize that the location of subsidiaries and aggregate levels of FDI flows are not the only salient features of MNCs' behavior. Much could thus be learned by following the example of authors such as Malesky (2008) and Henisz (2000) , who study other aspects of international investment such as province-level investment stocks, mode of entry (for example, joint ventures vs. fully owned subsidiaries), financing decisions (for example, equity vs. debt, local vs. international borrowing), or the location of headquarters (that is, corporate inversions). Alternatively, political economists could develop new theory to explain why different types of FDI may be more sensitive to political conditions than others 27 or focus on political consequences of FDI flows. 28 
